Monday, March 5, 2012

Metaphysical or Not


by Krishnaswamy

One of the main objections to an attempt at grounding ethical theories on metaphysical notions on being or individuality is the possibility of their being other metaphysical views and the impossibility of arbitrating between any two contending views on the notion of being. Thus the main advantage of a deontological tradition, which eschews a metaphysical approach, is that its concept of equality would be unique, in the sense of generating only one theory of justice and it would even have the added advantage of allowing the legitimacy of differing metaphysical views as to the good and thereby allowing the promotion of a plural society. But what if a theory of equality, in a deontological tradition, is not unique and suffers from the same defect -- the defect of engendering differing conceptions of justice -- as the metaphysical tradition? If such is the case, then we will have to discard both the metaphysical and the deontological approaches and try another method of establishing ethics. The capability approach is one such contender for leading the way in building ethics on new and surer grounds.

Before we do accept the capability approach, we will have to see whether their criticism against Rawls is a fair one and also whether Nussbaum’s approach is a completely new one in the sense of not being reducible to either the metaphysical or the deontological approach. From my reading of Sen (pg 20, Equality of What?), I gather that one main criticism of his centers around the inability of Rawls to determine complete equality (or individuality, both are, I feel, the same). Sen feels that there is still differing kinds of physical and mental abilities that make people differ. But these differences are merely physical or personal differences. The deontological tradition by explicitly avoiding the metaphysical (or physical) route doesn’t take into consideration such physical differences. A fatal objection to Rawls would be if there are moral differences between people.

One of the advantages that the capability approach has is that it doesn’t attempt at a metaphysical grounding. As Nussbaum herself says, “The capabilities are…presented as the source of political principles for a liberal pluralistic society; they are set in the context of a type of political liberalism that makes them specifically political goals and presents them in a manner free of any specific metaphysical grounding.” (pg 70) The capability approach, as we know, implicitly asserts that life or capabilities, or the exercise of them, is a good. According to me, any assertion that there is a good is a metaphysical view. If so, then the capability approach would seem to be reducible to a metaphysical approach and thereby suffer the same defects as that method. 

Sunday, March 4, 2012

Sen's Idea of Transcendentalism


By Tarang Kapoor

In The Idea of Justice Amartya Sen has presented a realization focused approach to justice. This approach is in striking contrast to the transcendental institutionalism which focuses on the search for transcendental, ideal and perfectly just institutions. He criticizes Rawls and other Contractarians, according to whom the institutions chosen for the development in the society, assume some unique principle of justice i.e. Rawls accepts one transcendental idea of distributive equality over all others. However, in his later works Rawls himself accepted that there can be a disagreement in the version of political justice people accept as reasonable. (The Laws of people, 1999)

Coming back to Sen, we see that he focuses on the actual realizations (comparative approach) which a society undergoes in the process of advancement of justice.  This approach opens up different comparative approaches to justice on the basis of which different institutions can be chosen for development in the society.

His disagreement with the idea of transcendentalism is on two grounds, one of them is the feasibility argument. My attempt in this small piece of writing is to show the weakness of this argument. The argument claims that since there is no reasonable agreement on the nature of ‘ideal society’ among Contractarians themselves therefore a transcendental solution is not feasible. On these lines he goes on to conclude that no Contract theory can be a legitimate solution to the problem of justice. I believe that the argument as it stands is quite weak. As, only because different versions of Contract theory do not agree with each other and have differences among them does not provide us with a strong reason to declare that the approach is not workable altogether. There can be a second order disagreement amongst them i.e. one social contract theory is a better option over the other, but these second order disagreements do not allow us to take a big leap forward and conclude that there is a first order disagreement also. There is a logical gap between the two judgements and non acceptance of the former cannot lead to the non acceptance of the latter. 

Some thoughts on Nussbaum's Ten Central Human Capabilities


by Nisheeth Yadav

I will try to argue that the nature of application of Nussbaum's capabilties seems to be possible only in a snapshot of time. In other words, it is probable that application of rules based on Nussbaum's capabilities over a sufficiently large period of time may lead to contradictions.

Nussbaum's capabilties focus over different spheres of the societal life, namely political, cultural and economic, in order to provide freedom and dignity to the individual in these areas. These are, without doubt, worthy goals. But these yardsticks may not be mutually compatible in the long run. This is because, given a sufficiently large time horizon, the political, economic and cultural spheres start influencing each other's composition due to their mutual interaction. The definition of capabilties need further fortification to withstand this flux.

Control over One's Environment vs Affiliation:

Nussbaum considers ability to hold property and having property rights as a central human capability. As has been discussed by numerous scholars and witnessed in many examples, a society with private property rights will get divided among property-owning and property-less classes. Such a society can readily provide circumstances for humiliation and loss of dignity.

Changing conception of religious duties:

Nussbaum mentions freedom for religious obersvance and events. It seems non-confrontational because today religious rituals are largely limited to activities which do not pose threat to life or bodily health of others. In the past, however, religious duties have involved inflicting pain on other groups. With the dynamic definition of religious observance and rituals, religious freedom should not be an absolute human capability.

I fully appreciate Nussbaum's contention that this list is not exhaustive, and in this spirit I submit that we need to further fine-tune the list of capabilites with an eye on long term perspective.

Human Security and Effects of Climate Change

by Tanmay V. Paranjape

Professor Amartya Sen has argued throughout the development of the Capability Approach that a broader understanding of human security is extremely important precisely because it affects human lives. The idea of what is called national security is somewhat more remote from human lives, in the sense that it is often defined in terms of military preparedness and other features of national policy. Prof. Sen emphasizes that people are more concerned about security of their own lives and of the lives of other people like them than wide concerns of national security.

I think one thing which needs to be borne in mind that human security is people centred and it focuses the attention of institutions on freedom of human individuals and their communities worldwide. This emphasis on human beings distinguishes human security from the objective of protecting state territories that dominated security policies in the past couple centuries. Thus we observe that human security in its broadest sense entails protection of fundamental freedom of citizens.

Now let me briefly say a few words about threats to human security. Direct threats to human security have been classified as critical and pervasive threats – severe and widespread in influence – respectively. In this light I want to bring to the fore the issue of the impact of climate change on the island nation of the Maldives.

The Maldives are a tiny nation with a fragile environment and a fragile democracy. The effects of global warming and rising sea levels have put this tiny nation under direct existential threat. If necessary measures are not undertaken with respect to its citizens, a whole people can get extinguished. The Maldives are comprised of nearly 1200 islands and atolls in the Indian Ocean. The combined land mass of the island is 115 square miles, about twice the size of Washington D.C. It is situated only 8 feet above sea level at its highest point. We are aware that global warming causes polar ice caps to melt and sea levels to rise, which in turn can put the Maldives’s entire existence in jeopardy.

In conclusion I want to say that since the United Nations Charter, ratified in 1945, has placed the Right of People to Self-determination in the forefront of International relations and also emphasized on the utmost importance of territorial integrity; I feel that Professor Sen’s Capability Approach on human security is at conflict here with these particular conditions. I believe that the International Community needs to realize its collective responsibility towards people of Maldives because will it be just to let a nation perish where the responsibility of the effects of climate change lie with whole International Community?

References
1. Human security Report of the Secretary-General, (http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/SG_Human_Security_Report_12_04_10.pdf)
2. A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, (http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper2.pdf)
3. The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques  and Recent Advances, (http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/14051/1/gprg-wps-032.pdf)
5. Justin Hoffmann, The Maldives and Rising Sea Levels, (http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/maldives.htm)
6. Human Security Now, Interview with Amartya Sen, (http://www.sgiquarterly.org/feature2003Jly-1.html)

The Capability Approach


by Shriddha Shah 

One of the objectives of the capabilities approach is to maintain a pluralistic liberal society. In this context, Nussbaum has given a list of 10 capabilities, which in her view are basic to understanding a life led with human dignity. She also maintains that despite having given this list the capability approach allows for the maintenance of pluralistic values in society and she gives some six points in defense of this.

In my view the problem that arises here is that she grounds this list in an intuitive idea of what a human life should be like. Now although she is open to revisions of the list and points out that there are no metaphysical underpinnings to her approach so that people who hold different metaphysical beliefs can appropriate it, there is still a problem here; as there is another significant aspect of the capabilities approach, which suggests that the capabilities offered are not only about what people feel in respect to them but it is what they can actually be or do, and therefore there ought to be a threshold level of each capability.

In my view the above two aspects can’t go together. For instance in a pluralistic society like India there are very many different world-views, so by the first aspect of the capabilities approach they should be allowed to thrive as per their interpretations of the various points on the list. But the second aspect suggests that they should have some minimum level of the items on that list. Now the points are who decides and how is that minimum level decided? And does that still allow for plurality? In my view these two aspects are not satisfactorily dealt with in the capabilities approach as it stands now.

Also the point about the difference in capability and functioning for each individual is ambiguous. Primarily what it means is that you may be capable of something but not do it. But if you don’t really do it how is one to judge whether you are capable of it. I make this point especially because it is a theory for social and political justice and therefore requires some external mechanism to allow for assessment.

Ethics of Justice and Ethics of Care revisited: Has Martha Nussbaum’s Approach got it right?


by Ayesha Gautam

In the history of moral philosophy ethics of justice or public reason advanced by liberal tradition and the ethics of care as advanced by feminists has been percieved to be at loggerheads with each other. There are various criticism which has been levelled by proponents of ethics of care against the ethics of justice. My endeavor in this paper would be to advance the criticisms put forth by care ethics proponents against ethics of justice proponents and to show how the version of capability approach advanced by Martha Nussbaum has been able to take care of these criticisms thereby advancing an approach which is truly humanistic in the sense that it gives importance to  both the virtue of justice as well as  the virtue of care.

Let me begin by advancing the criticism put forth by care ethics proponents against ethics of justice. There are  three charges feminists have commonly leveled against the ethics of justice advanced by liberal tradition:

        The first criticism is that the ethics of justice is too ‘individualistic’. The language of ethics of justice pushes us to see the participant in moral practice as single clamorous individuals. An ethics of care on the other hand examines moral issues, values, and problems discernible in human relationships. It values connections between individuals as against excessive individualism of liberal moral theories. Empathy, sensitivity and attention to particular aspects of persons and their needs become important. (Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1982

       The second criticism advanced is that the ideal of equality advanced by proponents of ethics of justice is too abstract and formal; ethics of justice promotes a formal equality of treatment and in the process abstracts from a real asymmetry of power. Ethics of justice insists on identical treatment for all   ; for women and men,   regardless of their different location in the social hierarchy. Ethics of care proponents however insists that one should also take care of the background inequalities. Impartiality and equality which was the distinguishing and defining feature of morality in ethics of justice was criticized as being counterintuitive to the moral sense of women.

        The third significant criticism advanced by care ethics proponents against ethics of justice is that the emphasis ethics of justice places on reason underplays the significance of care and emotion in moral and political life. Feminist attention to relations in the family and to the values of care and connection has also called attention to different kinds of interdependencies which are generally ignored by liberal traditions.

Having given an insight into the three commonly leveled criticisms against ethics of justice, let me now place Nussbaum’s position in context of these criticisms. The first criticism advanced is that ethics of justice is very individualistic. Nussbaum can be said to have taken care of this criticism when she takes cue for her approach from Grotius’s natural theory approach. Put very simply, this approach holds that the way to begin, when we think about fundamental principles, is to think of the human being as a creature characterized both by dignity or moral worth and by sociability: by “an impelling desire for fellowship.  Among the list of 10 capabilities, Nussbaum also lists the capability which states the capability of being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. Second criticism advanced against ethics of justice is that it gives too much importance to equality and the ideal of equality advanced by them is formal and abstract not taking care of the various inequalities which one encounters in day to day life. Nussbaum can be said to have taken care of this criticism in the four frontiers of justice which she discusses at length in her works. As a criticism against social contract theory , Nussbaum has argued that there theory of justice has not been able to handle four problems; justice owed to people with disabilities, justice owed across national boundaries, justice owed to other species and  justice owed to nature. By taking up these issues, Nussbaum has clearly shown that one ought to take care of these inequalities in their theory of morality. As regards the third criticism according to which ethics of justice gives more emphasis to reason thereby underplaying the significance of care and emotion, one can opine that Nussbaum has aptly taken care of this criticism also in her work by giving importance to the virtue of care and emotion along with that of rationality and justice. In her list of the central human capabilities, Nussbaum has created space for such virtues as emotions, senses, imagination and thought. Moreover in her work, Nussbaum wants to know the capabilities that lead to a 'truly human' life. It can be opined here that the capabilities that would lead to a truly human life are also the ones that ethics of care would want to know and support. This becomes clear when one looks at the definition of care advanced by ethics of care proponents.

The care that is valued by the ethics of care can – and to be justifiable must – include caring for distant others in an interdependent world, and caring that the rights of all are respected and their needs met. It must include caring that the environment in which embodied human beings reside is well cared for. The ethics of care will strive to achieve these transformations in society and the world nonviolently and democratically but with persistence {Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 2006, p66}

Brian Orend in his work has also opined that, “care for others means sympathizing with them and supporting them, helping them develop their skills, being committed to a personal connection with them based on trust and mutual respect, taking on responsibility to do what one can to ensure their well-being.” (Orend, B., 2002. Human Rights: Concept and Context. Peterborough, ON: Broadview pg 17)
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To conclude it can be opined that the two approaches i.e., ethics of care and the capability approach seem to share the common goal, which is promoting truly human lives.

Thursday, December 1, 2011

Rethinking Social Sciences and Humanities in the Contemporary World











George Varghese K is with the Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities, Manipal University.

Monday, November 21, 2011

Selfhood and Otherness: A Duologue


Prologue

What separates living things or more specifically Human beings from other things is the ability to do certain activities with an intention and to be conscious of what they do. This is why these other things are called dead or non living. This distinction between the living and the dead is of great philosophical interest. Humans are sentient, i.e. they are aware of what they do and what happens around them. By around I mean the surroundings and observance of nature which Humans as a spectator do. And this includes all the natural things as well as living things including plants, animals, insects etc. What separates Humans from others, for there do seems a difference between objects such as a rock table etc, organisms which includes animals, plants etc and Human beings on the one hand and my self. The point here is to understand and explore this distinction between the living and the dead. Or if I be more specific, the special feature or quality in Humans that separates them from every other thing in this nature, so what it is to be self and to be alive and how it is different from another thing which may not be alive? How are they different from each other? For if we fail to give an answer or reason for why we think like this, then though despite of noticing this distinction, we will fail to take it as a knowledge claim, and perhaps might just end up taking it to be like a folk psychological view.

In the hope of describing such confused matters carefully and clearly, an attempt is bestowed in the form of conversation between two persons in order to deal with the philosophy of simplicity, where the first mind or character Q, due to his curiosity and desire to know is unaware and the other person P, whose basis of knowledge is his simple is a disciple of life as proposed by the other self. Here the oblivious person due to his unknowingness is inquisitive and thus he can only find solutions of his doubts by either asking these queries to himself or to any other being. On the other hand, the other person, who is also desperate knowledge seeker, plays a role of learned for the time being, yet they may change their roles at times and this is agreed by the acceptance of both the persons. A major thing pertains from the nature of both these fictitious characters, and that is the importance of questioning in our lives. Questioning is normally a verbal act which is probably used to collect an amount of data to clear your doubts. Questions are addressed in two ways, firstly to the self and secondly, by to people other than you. Both Q and P follow both the ways, however, generally, it is considered that a person involved into self-questioning is deeper by nature. But this is only true and such a situation arises only, when one really accepts or knows that he is aware of something. Greek philosopher Socrates (469-399 B.C.) always questioned others in order to reach understanding. This was because he firmly felt that he knows nothing so how can he obtain his answers by questioning himself. However, in my opinion for the refinement and to increase the range of mind, one has to contemplate and hence has to reason, which is the cause of questioning. Therefore, in addition to the contemplation, both the characters follow that a query shall be put-forwarded to both, i.e., to themselves as well as to others.

The Duologue

Questioner- Good morning friend! Today you seem quite involved, and if I am not wrong, there is no one to share this involvement of yours.

Philosopher- That’s true,

Q- Since, I seldom find you sitting with someone and unoccupied, can I sit and spend some time along with you.

P- Well, I am always preoccupied with my thoughts and you are always welcome to have my company. But before you say something, please tell me, what made you to decide that you want to spend some time with me?

Q- It is a human need to share what he thinks and experiences about the world, every man talks to convey his message or to clear up his thoughts. And in the same way I felt that you are quite aware about life, you are the one who can fruitfully discuss on what I want to confer as I have often seen you giving confident answers to other people.

P- So you expect confident answers from me?

Q- Yes, why not? You are rational, and a rational being only gives a confident answer when he himself had done an analysis on what is asked to him, and when all the blurredness related to it is wiped out. And if not confident answers then at least questions which clarify the problem further.

P- Whatever you may think about me, but I know that I am ignorant and simply nothing but a naïf. Anyway, that’s my pleasure, but we can really have a worthwhile conversation, only when you will throw some light on what topic you want to confer.

Q- I am not a person, who concentrates and spends time on a continuous and single thought diligently, but in my mind, like sensations, thoughts come and go in different notes of time. Still like you, I also attempt to think of some or the other topic during long periods of time.

P- That’s nothing a cause of disturbance. So, at this very instant what problem you are wondering about?

Q- Yeah, at this moment I’m wondering about the problem of physical contact i.e., the problem of physical touch. I will say that we have a feeling of touch and touch is made physically on skin, i.e., when you make your hand or fingers in contact with my palm, I can sense and feel it, at the same time you also feel my palm. Now, when we are holding each other hands, we are joined by the sense of touch. Now, if some one else comes and hits you at your hand you will feel that sudden touch along with a pain, but I will remain unaffected.

P- That’s true

Q- When the third person hits you, I despite of being joined by the sense of touch with you remains unaffected, I like you have two ears, same one nose, same body and we belong to the same species still you remain unaffected by the sense of touch. Why is it so? When I can feel you and vice versa then how come what you feel I don’t?

P- Since you have noticed and conceived that much, then you must have also noticed that when you move, you carry yourself. I mean to say that when you walk or run, the material thing that you carry is your own body, which may be covered with your clothes, but since you have set upon these clothes deliberately, thus they are not your possessions. Now I can say that all you possess by yourself is nothing else but your body. Now when you talk about the sense of touch, then in every moment of your life and also when you were in your mother’s womb, you always had experienced a continuous sense of touch. Even when you stand naked then also you are in a continuous touch with the invisible air. Now other than your living soul, all the material things are just things, i.e., non-living things, which possess no senses at all. Similarly except for your own body, air, me or any other matter is foreign and thus it does not affect you. You are self-contained only with your own body. You are only true for yourself. Well, briefly I can end by saying that for you, self is your only possession and reality.

Q- I think I am able to collect your notion.

P- Just to explain you in a different way, I will say that each one of us is different individually, this word ‘individual’ is important, though each individual has its own self, which is the reality and commonness. Still, we are real only for us, as just mentioned right before this statement. Thus, I can say that we are different both at the physical and mental level. If we try to make a chain of similarities between any two individuals, then it is certain that this chain will break at a very short length.

Q- I am getting but you said that clothes are my deliberate possessions and not my absolute possessions.

P- Yes, it is quite evident.

Q- Now when someone hits you, while you are in a physical contact with me, I never feel the pain that you experience, unless and until that third person hits me directly. But when I am wearing clothes over my body, and when the other man hits me, still I can feel that pain. Is that hitting is passed from the clothes to me. If yes, then why it does not passes through your body to my body?

P- Listen, you know that clothes can be of cotton and also of wool.

Q- So,

P- So, when you wear a woollen sweater, then on hitting, you feel less pain than when you are wearing a thin cotton shirt.

Q- That’s true.

P- This corresponds that the more thickly the cloth, lesser the pain you feel. This happens because the hitting on cloth affects your body as it presses your body along with it. However, in the case when someone wallops me, you will never feel the pain that I have faced, until I don’t imply my self harshly on to you, or the other person hits directly to you. This is because, no matter where or for how long the other man hits me, the point of contact where we are touching remains unaffected.

Q- But what about my other private possessions like hair, our hair unless disturbed from the root are never sensed by us. Are they really my private possessions? If yes, then why don’t we feel any pain when we cut them? Why you when I am in touch with you is not my private possession? And if you answer no then in what different sense they are attached from my scalp? Why they are my private possessions?

P- As far as clothes and other things are concerned, I have already up to quite an extent cleared that they are with you temporarily. Now hair according to a trichologist is made up of dead cells and thus they have no sensation associated with them, hence we don’t feel any pain when we cut our hair. What I am saying is a biological fact.

Q- But what does dead cell here means? Or moreover, what does dead as an adjective to the word cell means? I am concerned not with the biological properties of the word dead, but with the rational or philosophical concept of it. Now if we consider the conventional meaning of dead, i.e., non-living, then I do not understand that why and how a dead or a non-living thing or in other words a thing with a non-life element is attached to our body and still is dead, and still does not rot... How come?

P- Ah! You know that you indirectly are approaching to the one of the most intriguing and difficult questions that can be asked. Difficult not for those people who are uninvolved and not curious, but to people like you and me, the one who have a thirst for knowledge, and I have been pondering about it from a long time. Here the summary is the distinction between the dead and the living. Say for the case that when we talk in philosophical terms then what a living body functions is equivalent to a dead body as well. We know that a thing is living and the other non-living, but this knowledge about this distinction is something like an immediate inference. When we try to make a distinction in terms of origin, then both living and non-living bodies are reproduced and finally decay. We are born through our parents and similarly a stone is an aggregation produced from minerals and rock material. Like living bodies, non-living bodies too inherit few properties from their original cause and some properties are entirely different from their parents. Say for instance water. Water has a completely different property from its original material, i.e., from hydrogen and oxygen. And further, the basic unit of any body, whether for living or non-living is what scientists assert as atoms, however that’s a different story because there are still no ultimate units known. Thus, why the hair of human shows this dualism is the root cause of what we want to know. The solution of such questions will actually lead us to the distinction between the living and the dead. Biologically, this distinction is favoured by the functional attributes of the body, which is in some way peripheral.

Q- The living bodies, of which you are talking about, are compared with the non-living bodies such as a stone. Can you explain the matter of your worry in terms of an illustration and with a system adopted for knowing this distinction?

P- Yes, I may take the example of a small stone and a plant seed. When I consider them I notice that physically, they except for their secondary qualities such as colour, surface etc are same. However for a botanist a seed may be made up of complex compounds and a stone for a geologist may be an aggregation of minerals and they may be right in their case, but still for me, physically they are one and the same. They generally have comparable weight, size and physical properties. More importantly they are one and the same for me because they both hitherto share a vital similarity between each other and it is that both are dead bodies. But still when a seed is kept in a water or soil, unlike a stone it modifies. These modifications are not the changes which occur due to the chemical alterations, as chemical changes happens with a stone under the influence of other chemicals also, but the modification in which a self functioned parts, i.e., root and shoot develops automatically. And this modification is unaffected temporally. Now the physical objects which were physically similar are completely different after the sowing of the seed. What happens that causes this difference between these two objects? A stone unlike a plant seed, kept in any situation can never proliferate by itself. For a practical man, the idea that these two objects were same is a fallacious idea, but mind it, this idea of physical similarity is not a fictitious one, but based on my immediate observation and the axiom given by Dutch philosopher Benedict Spinoza, which says “Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness…”, i.e., known by a change. The answer on how this modification occurs is given by a biochemist, but why or what makes it to be in this state of lifeless to a life-filled body is never answered. As the concept of practical men is itself not substantial because they do not seemed to be much bothered with the above question and this is what the biggest problem that I face. So, in many aspects the answer of the mutual relationship between the living and dead is not known, and if given, irrespective of the fact whosoever gives it, the solutions are more or less unsatisfactory for either of us.

Q- In support of your answer, I would like to add that many practical people place living things in the material world. They support this view by holding that living things are nothing but a very complex form of chemicals and their multifarious actions, whereas non-living things are just a simpler version of them. However I have to mention the inconsistencies related to this, as if today or in future we develop an android, philosophically speaking he is ought to be different from a human being. They are not just internally different but also essentially different. And this affirmation of mine is by a pure faith and not a blind faith that there is a distinction between living and non-living, the same which you talked about a stone and a seed. The will that I possess is indubitably something extraordinary for a rock.

P- I have no problem with your opinion and I readily agree with you, but we need to have a justification for what we state.

Q- What’s in your mind?

P- Well let me read out some portions to you from the notebook that I am carrying, in which I have listed my thoughts. May be that will provide us with some solution or at least will help us to investigate the issue in a better way.

Q- Yes, please go ahead!

P- I Define Credit as the necessary praise or blame that we “attribute” (or is “attributed”) to a cause because of the benefit or harm which that cause provides to us. And by Will, I mean nothing but the subsequent effect of the Credit, which necessarily causes a specific action. Further, that action of the Will is called an Attempt or Volition, which is an inevitable consequence of the Will, i.e. which if follows, follows necessarily and only from Will.

Q- Do you think that really is the case?

P- The Will to do anything arises ultimately from a self-Credit or a Credit attributed by someone to us. For it is clear from the Definition of Credit that unless we don’t praise or blame ourselves (pre)consciously or the (external) cause leading to this effect, it is not feasible that a person may react (Attempt) or act. Therefore, the Will which is the reason for our actions is actually a necessary result of the Credit and nothing else. So by this understanding I say that by a Living Thing I mean a thing possessing the ability of Attempt, and likewise a Dead thing does not possess this ability. Living things are distinct from Dead things in so far they Attempt, or have the ability of Attempt. Such things as far as they Attempt and act or possess this ability are said to be living, and the duration of their living is called Life. So I have attempted to give an answer to your question. Think and we can surely discuss more on this when we meet again.

Q- Well, I will surely think about it, and I am glad that now I have something more to ponder about. You know, it is interesting that these matters that we have discussed right now at the face of it appears trivial and hair trifling, but the moment we go beyond the face value of things, then what we call trivial matters becomes philosophy, and we can learn more. Thank you my friend for ending on such a good note. Thanks and farewell!

P- My pleasure!

Anish Chakravarty is junior research fellow at the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi. He completed his BA (2009) and MA (2011) in Philosophy from Zakir Husain College, New Delhi and Hindu College, Delhi respectively. He is the co-editor of Metamorphosis: Delhi University Student’s Philosophy Journal (2011). His research interests include philosophy of Spinoza, metaphysical cosmology, human free will and determinism, conceptualism and the meaning of life.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

The Whim of the Nose: Of How Expectations are Fulfilled, or Not


In Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol’s The Nose, Major Kovalev wakes up one morning, stretches his arms and reaches out for a hand-mirror kept on the table near his bed. He meant to inspect a pimple that had broken out on his nose the night before. He starts from the right side of his face, notices his right ear in the mirror, the corner of his eye and his disheveled hair. Moving his face leftwards, he stops with a gasp. He witnesses an absence. To his utter astonishment there is nothing but a flat patch on his face where the nose should have been. There is no nose! In his shaken state, he examines his face further left. He sees everything else as expected, his left ear, his eyes, his mouth. But instead of fulfillment of the perceptual anticipations associated with the nose, he encounters only disappointment. He rubs his eyes, washes his face and pinches himself to ensure that he is not still asleep. But the nose continues to evade him.

We have here a case of absence — one where expectation is dramatically violated. It remains unfulfilled, generating a perceptual disappointment. Four observations are striking:

OBSERVATION 1. Any absence presumes a prior presence, i.e., a case of normal perception. The absence of the nose necessitates that the nose had once been where it isn’t now.
OBSERVATION 2. This prior presence (normal perception) is the cause of anticipation. Having repeatedly seen the nose every time Kovalev looked at his face in the mirror, he had an expectation to see it again.
OBSERVATION 3. In the case of perceptual negation these anticipations are disappointed. So when Kovalev took the mirror in his hand this time and did not find his nose, he was left aghast.
OBSERVATION 4. Absences are not absolute in the sense of pure nothing. In the inspection of his face, Kovalev encounters a partial unfulfillment. In the place of the nose is now a flat patch of skin and apart from the nose, the face presents no contradiction to his expectation.

The question now is: what triggers the failure of anticipation. In other words, what is the justification for and source of perceptual negation (experiential absence). This is the problem that concerns us, and I attempt to construct what a Husserlian answer to this would be. The emphasis in this treatment is on experiential or perceptual negation as a cognitive act rather than negation associated with propositions. This will involve a comprehensive survey of the character of a ‘normal’ perception which will lead us to the cases of what I call ‘non-normal’ (negative) perception. Husserl, in Experience and Judgment (1997 [1939]) broaches the question of negative judgments. These are dealt with in a more rigorous manner in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (2001). Following an examination of the case of the missing nose through the four observations listed above, we will encounter the mystery of the source and justification of absence itself. On a close examination, we will find that the locus of absence is not consciousness although it is consciousness which experiences it.

In the course of this discussion some terms will be used frequently: expectations, anticipations, protentions, fulfillment, un-fulfillment, disappointment, negation, absence. Of these, the first three are roughly used as synonyms and I define them as future orientations of consciousness with respect to an object. Fulfillment can be understood as the affirmation of these orientations in experience. The last four are once again near synonyms and are to be characterised as the opposite of fulfillment, i.e., the experience of something other than expected.

First, we broach the question of what is the nature of (NORMAL) perception for Husserl. Perception is the unfolding of an aspect of the object and a manifold of such appearances constructs the unity of sense. It proceeds in a flow of series of phases, with each of these phases synthesized to compose the unity and harmony of the perceptual object which is thereby originally constituted. In the act of perception, what is genuinely presented is one particular aspect of the object. Yet there is a facade of the object being given in its entirety. The object in perception is something more than what is genuinely perceived. But the peculiarity of perception is that it is of the nature of a pretension. It poses to realize something that it never can since all that is revealed in a single act of perception is one particular aspect/phase of an object.

External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. (Husserl 2001: 39)

If perception is only given in phases, it is implicit that an object can never be fully known. The object is not given at once in full and there always remains the possibility of perceiving aspects other than previously perceived. In this sense, there can never be a closure or a complete determination.

The transitions of appearances following one after the other are all in dynamic displacement, enrichment and impoverishment. The object appearing constantly new, constantly different, is constituted as the same in these exceedingly intricate and wondrous system of intention and fulfillment that make up the appearances. But the object is never finished, never fixed completely. (Husserl 2001: 50)

Having said that perception of an object is actually nothing more than a series of phases, we must ask, what generates this illusion of unity and completeness of an object. In the perception of one aspect, there is an implicit consciousness of other aspects, which are not immediately visible. These exist as co-present — as part of the horizons of possibility of the object as retained in consciousness — and give unity to the object experience.

To take an example from Husserl, in the perception of a table, what we actually (genuinely) have is the view of the table ‘from some particular side’. But obviously that is not all that there is to the table, the table has still other sides. It has ‘a non-visible back side, it has a non-visible interior; and these are actually indexes for a variety of sides, a variety of complexes of possible visibility’ (Husserl 2001). This remarkable feature is central to perceptual experience. The other immediately non-visible sides of the table are co-present in the act and this gives a sense of unity in the perception of a ‘table’.  These co-present sides await their fulfillment in subsequent acts of perception.

In moving from a side that is given, to one that is not immediately given ‘now’ we move from fullness to emptiness, i.e., from something known, ‘given in flesh’ to something that is not yet so given. The movement from fullness to emptiness (in moving away from given-ness) is not in the direction of ‘nothing-ness’. This emptiness seeks to be fulfilled and anticipations are laden with the desire to determine an object more and more closely within the pre-figuring of an intuitively given framework. Expectations are a product of empty intentions whose possibilities are thus pre-figured. The actualization of anticipations (protentions) bestows fullness to what was empty. Yet with each instant of fulfillment there is a fading away of the aspect prior to the new perspective and it gradually becomes completely invisible, though held in retention. In this sense, there is a movement also in the opposite direction – from emptiness to fullness. Emptiness and fullness, concealment and projection thus have a dynamic relation, each moving towards the other in acts of perception.

Continually progressing fulfillment is at the same time a continually progressing emptying (Husserl 2001: 45).

Though there is a seeming fullness of consciousness in the act of perception, there exists a horizon of empty intentions waiting to be fulfilled. In perception, an anticipation which was previously only co-present becomes actual. At the same time there is a whole range of other co-present profiles waiting to be fulfilled. The object is presented not only by means of what is given, but also by means of what is not given, but possible — and this is the range of empty horizons. Fulfillment in the ‘now’ instant is the sign of a valid act of perception without any annulment, an affirmative perception of self giving. This is what we call a case of normal perception.

In all cases of normal perception, there is a unity of the object which manifests in spite of the wholeness of object being given in a non-genuine manner. The object is never grasped in its entirety and there is always a horizon of possibilities — possibilities of determining more closely.

In the normal case of perception, all fulfillment progresses as the fulfillment of expectations. These are systematized expectations, systems of rays of expectations which, in being fulfilled, also become enriched; that is, the empty sense becomes richer in sense, fitting into the way in which the sense was prefigured (Husserl 2001: 64).

Further,
Where there is no horizon, where there are no empty intentions, there is likewise no [synthesis of] fulfillment (ibid.: 108).

Therefore in every perceptual given-ness, there is a part which is familiar by virtue of its immediately being present and a part which is now unfamiliar (thus only co-present and not present) but may manifest as a possible perception. Through the series of aspect viewings there is a synthesis and what remains constant is the object, though not genuinely given in the act itself. The fulfillment associated with anticipations is concomitant with a yet closer determination of the object.

When we perceive a tree from the front, and wanting to know it better, draw nearer to it and now perceive it in new perceptions; by determining the tree more closely, we also have a fulfilling confirmation. Meanwhile, every external perception harbours its inner and outer horizons, regardless the extent to which perception has the character of self-giving; this is to say, it is a consciousness that simultaneously points beyond its own content. In its fullness it simultaneously points into an emptiness that would only now convey a new perception (Husserl 2001: 108).

To sum up (a) genuine perception proceeds in phases (b) yet there is a unity of perceptual object (c) because other aspects of the object are co-present (by virtue of the horizon of empty intentions) in the act of perception (d) nevertheless there is always a possibility of determining an object more closely.

Now having spoken of normal perception, we attempt to determine what is ‘NON-NORMAL’. In this manner we shall understand the nuances of perceptual negation. If Kovalev had woken up that morning and his anticipation associated with his nose had not failed, we would have had a case of normal perception. However what we are presented with now is a situation where we meet a failure, a negation — an absence, namely of the nose.

Negation is the failure of anticipation. It manifests when there is a disappointment with respect to the ‘now’ instant, i.e. the immediate moment of perceptual experience given to consciousness. Concordance is not a necessary feature of consciousness (with respect to perception) and this is manifested in the disappointment of anticipations, where the synthesis of fulfillment is held in scrutiny.

[S]uppose that we have observed a ball uniformly red; for a time the course of perception continues in such a way that this apprehension is harmoniously fulfilled. But now, in the progress of the perception, a part of the back side, not seen at first, is gradually revealed; and in opposition to the original prescription, which ran ‘uniformly red, uniformly spherical’, there emerges a consciousness of otherness, which disappoints the anticipation: ‘not red, but green’, ‘not spherical but dented’ (Husserl 1997).

Our experience of a rotating red ball fulfills the associated anticipation through the uniformity and continuity of its colour, shape, etc. throughout acts of perception. If however, a part of it were to be revealed as green instead of red and dented instead of spherical, the original anticipation is disappointed and it would be a case of perceptual negation.

To review the observations with which we began:

A negative perception however presumes that a normal perception (this is red, this is a ball/here is a nose) has already taken place, one which was unhindered and against whose background the negation manifests as a negation now (this is not red, this is not a ball/there is no nose) (OBSERVATION 1). The constitution of the object precedes its modification into a negation. It is thus parasitical on the affirming perception and may be seen as a modification of it.

When Kovalev begins to look at his face and first sees his right profile without having noticed the absence yet, implicit in his act of perception (of the face) is the nose, as co-present. It is an expectation that awaits fulfillment as he moves his face leftwards. What gives rise to this expectation is the ubiquity of the nose in all his normal perceptions until the moment he finds it missing (OBSERVATION 2). The perception of an aspect of the face lies within a general framework of sense – of what is the range of possibility of a face. This in Husserl’s term would be a ‘pre-figuring’ which determines the horizon of possibility. Yet this horizon of possibility cannot be conceived of in a vacuum. It must have an experiential basis, a precedence — a previous instance.  Only such an experiential basis would guarantee the possibility of re-identification such that what was once an object of perception can be evoked again and empty retentions can be filled up. In this sense, the possibility of recognition is not closed by the arrival of a fresh aspect. In spite of the absence of the nose, Kovalev does not fail to recognize the face – but there is a renewed perception of it. 

The fact that a re-perception, a renewed perception of the same thing is possible for transcendence characterizes the fundamental trait of transcendent perception, alone through which an abiding world is there for us, a reality that can be pregiven for us and can be freely at our disposal (Husserl 2001: 47).

The nature of perceptual cognition is such that it is inalienable from the desire for the realization of that which is anticipated. Disappointments then manifest due to non-realization of anticipation. The desire to find the nose on looking at the mirror must be a product of previous encounters. In Kovalev’s case this desire remains unfulfilled — he is disappointed (OBSERVATION 3).

Yet, this unfulfillment is not absolute. This can be understood in two related ways: (a) The absence does not entirely challenge the general criterion of intelligibility of lived experience. In other words, the absence of the nose does not disable Kovalev from cognizing the event – however absurd it may be. (b) The perception of absence lies within a unity of experience.  Kovalev perceives the face still — the absence of the nose on the face. In moving from right to left, there is a continuity of the experiential object – an aspect of which appears otherwise than expected. This unity is a product of the very structure of consciousness: ‘retention—now—protention’. As defined earlier, retention refers to the presentation of the perceptual act (of a phase) which is retained in consciousness even though it is no longer immediately present. Protention is presentation of that which is hitherto not given, but is yet to be perceived, thus embodying that which is expected. Retentional consciousness enables a pre-figuring of the empty horizons of perception such that it is inalienably associated with anticipations. 

In spelling out negation of anticipations, Husserl always speaks of fulfillment as partial. Partial fulfillment grants to experience the unity necessary for the act to maintain its flow, and as such there cannot be a complete non-fulfillment.  The absence of the nose does not constrain the unfolding of perceptual experience, of the face as a whole. But the perception now is not of the nose but of something else, a flat patch (OBSERVATION 4). The lived experience does manifest as continuous, but it appears to be other than expected (a flat patch and not the nose), thereby calling for an abrupt break. There is a substratum which is the body of change, of becoming otherwise, of alteration. The substratum working as the general framework persists throughout the act of perception giving unity of the act.

The conflict between contrary determinations (amid what is anticipated and what is presented) results in the institution of a new and altered perceptual sense. Not only does the sense of the presented object get altered, but intentions associated with it and the structure of now possible anticipations also gets modified. The origin of negation is in the pre-predicative realm of receptive experience. Green superimposes itself on the empty red-intention (a flat patch superimposes itself on the nose) thereby altering the substratum given in the original perception – giving it a new sense, and crossing out the anticipated sense. In the unfolding of perception, a sense is either affirmed (when fulfilled) or renewed (when unfulfilled).

To sum up, normal unobstructed original object-constitution must precede negation. This original constitution is carried out in a series of apperceptive apprehensions which are held in retention and thus generate expectation. Negation is a case of modification, which is essentially of the nature of a superimposition due to a case of conflicting intentions directed against each other. So what is fundamental to negation is the displacement and substitution of one sense (old sense) by another (new sense). Yet this annulment is never absolute but concerns itself with a limited range.

To return to the Nose, let us examine two possibilities: (a) absence as external event, without its locus in consciousness (b) absence as a modification of an intending consciousness. In other words, absence could either be a whim of the nose (as external to consciousness) or a whim of (an intending) consciousness. Either the nose walked off in the middle of the night or it had gone missing by trick of Kovalev’s own intentions. There is some absurdity in the second case, where a consciousness simultaneously expects X and intends not-X. For this reason, by admitting the possibility of perceptual negation, one necessitates withdrawal from a reality that is purely submerged and justified by consciousness. In both cases, no doubt it is consciousness which experiences the perceptual negation. But it seems that the source and justification of negation cannot be derived from consciousness. The notion of externality comes with a force the moment one desires to construe what triggered a disappointment. It is perhaps for this reason that Husserl’s descriptions of the constitution of perceptual sense carry an underlying assertion: that to constitute is not to create. Rather it is the condition of the possibility of experience and knowledge.

David Hume in pleading the case of habit asserted the essential unjustifiability of our beliefs about the external world. Being accustomed to the manner in which experience has proceeded in the past we have the expectation for a similar future. That the sun shall rise every morning is an inductive generalization from our experience of sun having risen every morning. Yet such an experience must always be probabilistic in nature. One cannot be absolutely certain about its claims, there might be an abrupt denial. Interestingly, such a denial come as a completely alarm to the experiencing subject. Habit has to have an empirical basis. The Nose presents one such case of perceptual denial. It proves that the nature of reality is ultimately contingent and the subject’s construal of an object’s horizon of possibility cannot obstruct a denial. In fact the horizon of possibility extends with every disappointment — perhaps a little with the green dented rear-side of the ball and a great deal more with a missing nose! In this sense, the main role of negation is to push the limit of the actual world.

To answer the question with which we began, what must trigger the failure of an anticipation, the answer can only be the contingent character of nature — the whim of the nose — and thereby of perceptual experience. The pre-figurings in the empty horizons waiting to be fulfilled, might not be fulfilled precisely because consciousness cannot determine and ensure a fulfillment. The external, one hand, determines what consciousness must anticipate. On the other, it is also responsible for whether the anticipated will be fulfilled or not. While perceptual experience is essential to consciousness and the locus of its strength, perceptual fulfillment is only its desire, and could be construed as the Achilles’ heel, a territory over which consciousness cannot have any real power, yet it continues to yearn for it.

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Silika Mohapatra is doctoral researcher at the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi and was formerly visiting researcher at the Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa (2010). She completed her BA (2007) and MA (2009) in philosophy from St. Stephen's College, Delhi. Her research interests include classical metaphysics, phenomenology, philosophy of technology, post-human studies and the ethics of self and society. She is the co-editor of Indian Political Thought: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2010).