We have here a case of absence — one where expectation is
dramatically violated. It remains unfulfilled, generating a perceptual
disappointment. Four observations are striking:
OBSERVATION 1. Any absence presumes a prior presence,
i.e., a case of normal perception. The absence of the nose necessitates
that the nose had once been where it isn’t now.
OBSERVATION 2. This prior presence (normal perception) is
the cause of anticipation. Having repeatedly seen the nose every time
Kovalev looked at his face in the mirror, he had an expectation to see it
again.
OBSERVATION 3. In the case of perceptual negation these
anticipations are disappointed. So when Kovalev took the mirror in his hand
this time and did not find his nose, he was left aghast.
OBSERVATION 4. Absences are not absolute in the sense of
pure nothing. In the inspection of his face, Kovalev encounters a partial
unfulfillment. In the place of the nose is now a flat patch of skin and apart
from the nose, the face presents no contradiction to his expectation.
The question now is: what triggers the failure of
anticipation. In other words, what is the justification for and source of
perceptual negation (experiential absence). This is the problem that concerns
us, and I attempt to construct what a Husserlian answer to this would be. The
emphasis in this treatment is on experiential or perceptual negation as a
cognitive act rather than negation associated with propositions. This will
involve a comprehensive survey of the character of a ‘normal’ perception which
will lead us to the cases of what I call ‘non-normal’ (negative) perception.
Husserl, in Experience and Judgment (1997 [1939]) broaches the
question of negative judgments. These are dealt with in a more rigorous manner
in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (2001).
Following an examination of the case of the missing nose through the four
observations listed above, we will encounter the mystery of the source and
justification of absence itself. On a close examination, we will find that the
locus of absence is not consciousness although it is consciousness which
experiences it.
In the course of this discussion some terms will be used
frequently: expectations, anticipations, protentions, fulfillment,
un-fulfillment, disappointment, negation, absence. Of these, the first three
are roughly used as synonyms and I define them as future orientations of
consciousness with respect to an object. Fulfillment can be understood as the
affirmation of these orientations in experience. The last four are once again
near synonyms and are to be characterised as the opposite of fulfillment, i.e.,
the experience of something other than expected.
First, we broach the question of what is the nature of
(NORMAL) perception for Husserl. Perception is the unfolding of an aspect of
the object and a manifold of such appearances constructs the unity of sense. It
proceeds in a flow of series of phases, with each of these phases synthesized
to compose the unity and harmony of the perceptual object which is thereby
originally constituted. In the act of perception, what is genuinely presented
is one particular aspect of the object. Yet there is a facade of the object
being given in its entirety. The object in perception is something more than
what is genuinely perceived. But the peculiarity of perception is that it is of
the nature of a pretension. It poses to realize something that it never can
since all that is revealed in a single act of perception is one particular
aspect/phase of an object.
External perception is a constant pretension to
accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to
accomplish. (Husserl 2001: 39)
If perception is only given in phases, it is implicit that
an object can never be fully known. The object is not given at once in full and
there always remains the possibility of perceiving aspects other than
previously perceived. In this sense, there can never be a closure or a complete
determination.
The transitions of appearances following one after the
other are all in dynamic displacement, enrichment and impoverishment. The
object appearing constantly new, constantly different, is constituted as the
same in these exceedingly intricate and wondrous system of intention and
fulfillment that make up the appearances. But the object is never finished,
never fixed completely. (Husserl 2001: 50)
Having said that perception of an object is actually nothing
more than a series of phases, we must ask, what generates this illusion of unity
and completeness of an object. In the perception of one aspect, there is an
implicit consciousness of other aspects, which are not immediately visible.
These exist as co-present — as part of the horizons of possibility of
the object as retained in consciousness — and give unity to the object
experience.
To take an example from Husserl, in the perception of a
table, what we actually (genuinely) have is the view of the table ‘from some
particular side’. But obviously that is not all that there is to the table, the
table has still other sides. It has ‘a non-visible back side, it has a
non-visible interior; and these are actually indexes for a variety of sides, a
variety of complexes of possible visibility’ (Husserl 2001). This
remarkable feature is central to perceptual experience. The other immediately
non-visible sides of the table are co-present in the act and this gives a sense
of unity in the perception of a ‘table’. These co-present sides await
their fulfillment in subsequent acts of perception.
In moving from a side that is given, to one that is not
immediately given ‘now’ we move from fullness to emptiness, i.e., from
something known, ‘given in flesh’ to something that is not yet so given. The
movement from fullness to emptiness (in moving away from given-ness) is not in
the direction of ‘nothing-ness’. This emptiness seeks to be fulfilled and
anticipations are laden with the desire to determine an object more and more
closely within the pre-figuring of an intuitively given framework. Expectations
are a product of empty intentions whose possibilities are thus pre-figured.
The actualization of anticipations (protentions) bestows fullness to what was
empty. Yet with each instant of fulfillment there is a fading away of the
aspect prior to the new perspective and it gradually becomes completely
invisible, though held in retention. In this sense, there is a movement
also in the opposite direction – from emptiness to fullness. Emptiness and
fullness, concealment and projection thus have a dynamic relation, each moving
towards the other in acts of perception.
Continually progressing fulfillment is at the same time a
continually progressing emptying (Husserl 2001: 45).
Though there is a seeming fullness of consciousness in the
act of perception, there exists a horizon of empty intentions waiting to be
fulfilled. In perception, an anticipation which was previously only co-present
becomes actual. At the same time there is a whole range of other
co-present profiles waiting to be fulfilled. The object is presented not only
by means of what is given, but also by means of what is not given, but possible
— and this is the range of empty horizons. Fulfillment in the ‘now’ instant is
the sign of a valid act of perception without any annulment, an affirmative perception
of self giving. This is what we call a case of normal perception.
In all cases of normal perception, there is a unity of the
object which manifests in spite of the wholeness of object being given in a
non-genuine manner. The object is never grasped in its entirety and there is
always a horizon of possibilities — possibilities of determining more closely.
In the normal case of perception, all fulfillment
progresses as the fulfillment of expectations. These are systematized
expectations, systems of rays of expectations which, in being fulfilled, also
become enriched; that is, the empty sense becomes richer in sense, fitting into
the way in which the sense was prefigured (Husserl 2001: 64).
Further,
Where there is no horizon, where there are no empty intentions,
there is likewise no [synthesis of] fulfillment (ibid.: 108).
Therefore in every perceptual given-ness, there is a part
which is familiar by virtue of its immediately being present and a part which
is now unfamiliar (thus only co-present and not present) but may manifest as a
possible perception. Through the series of aspect viewings there is a synthesis
and what remains constant is the object, though not genuinely given in the act
itself. The fulfillment associated with anticipations is concomitant with a yet
closer determination of the object.
When we perceive a tree from the front, and wanting to
know it better, draw nearer to it and now perceive it in new perceptions; by
determining the tree more closely, we also have a fulfilling confirmation.
Meanwhile, every external perception harbours its inner and outer horizons,
regardless the extent to which perception has the character of self-giving;
this is to say, it is a consciousness that simultaneously points beyond its own
content. In its fullness it simultaneously points into an emptiness that would
only now convey a new perception (Husserl 2001: 108).
To sum up (a) genuine perception proceeds in phases (b)
yet there is a unity of perceptual object (c) because other aspects of
the object are co-present (by virtue of the horizon of empty intentions) in the
act of perception (d) nevertheless there is always a possibility of
determining an object more closely.
Now having spoken of normal perception, we attempt to
determine what is ‘NON-NORMAL’. In this manner we shall understand the nuances
of perceptual negation. If Kovalev had woken up that morning and his
anticipation associated with his nose had not failed, we would have had a case
of normal perception. However what we are presented with now is a situation
where we meet a failure, a negation — an absence, namely of the nose.
Negation is the failure of anticipation. It manifests when
there is a disappointment with respect to the ‘now’ instant, i.e. the immediate
moment of perceptual experience given to consciousness. Concordance is not a
necessary feature of consciousness (with respect to perception) and this is
manifested in the disappointment of anticipations, where the synthesis of
fulfillment is held in scrutiny.
[S]uppose that we have observed a ball uniformly red; for
a time the course of perception continues in such a way that this apprehension
is harmoniously fulfilled. But now, in the progress of the perception, a part
of the back side, not seen at first, is gradually revealed; and in opposition
to the original prescription, which ran ‘uniformly red, uniformly spherical’,
there emerges a consciousness of otherness, which disappoints the anticipation:
‘not red, but green’, ‘not spherical but dented’ (Husserl 1997).
Our experience of a rotating red ball fulfills the
associated anticipation through the uniformity and continuity of its colour,
shape, etc. throughout acts of perception. If however, a part of it were to be
revealed as green instead of red and dented instead of spherical, the original
anticipation is disappointed and it would be a case of perceptual negation.
To review the observations with which we began:
A negative perception however presumes that a normal
perception (this is red, this is a ball/here is a nose) has already taken
place, one which was unhindered and against whose background the negation
manifests as a negation now (this is not red, this is not a ball/there is no
nose) (OBSERVATION 1). The constitution of the object precedes its modification
into a negation. It is thus parasitical on the affirming perception and may be
seen as a modification of it.
When Kovalev begins to look at his face and first sees his
right profile without having noticed the absence yet, implicit in his act of
perception (of the face) is the nose, as co-present. It is an expectation that
awaits fulfillment as he moves his face leftwards. What gives rise to this
expectation is the ubiquity of the nose in all his normal perceptions until the
moment he finds it missing (OBSERVATION 2). The perception of an aspect of the
face lies within a general framework of sense – of what is the range of
possibility of a face. This in Husserl’s term would be a ‘pre-figuring’ which
determines the horizon of possibility. Yet this horizon of possibility cannot
be conceived of in a vacuum. It must have an experiential basis, a precedence —
a previous instance. Only such an experiential basis would guarantee the
possibility of re-identification such that what was once an object of
perception can be evoked again and empty retentions can be filled up. In this
sense, the possibility of recognition is not closed by the arrival of a fresh
aspect. In spite of the absence of the nose, Kovalev does not fail to recognize
the face – but there is a renewed perception of it.
The fact that a re-perception, a renewed perception of
the same thing is possible for transcendence characterizes the fundamental
trait of transcendent perception, alone through which an abiding world is there
for us, a reality that can be pregiven for us and can be freely at our disposal (Husserl
2001: 47).
The nature of perceptual cognition is such that it is
inalienable from the desire for the realization of that which is anticipated.
Disappointments then manifest due to non-realization of anticipation. The
desire to find the nose on looking at the mirror must be a product of previous
encounters. In Kovalev’s case this desire remains unfulfilled — he is
disappointed (OBSERVATION 3).
Yet, this unfulfillment is not absolute. This can be
understood in two related ways: (a) The absence does not entirely challenge the
general criterion of intelligibility of lived experience. In other words, the
absence of the nose does not disable Kovalev from cognizing the event – however
absurd it may be. (b) The perception of absence lies within a unity of
experience. Kovalev perceives the face still — the absence of the nose on
the face. In moving from right to left, there is a continuity of the
experiential object – an aspect of which appears otherwise than expected. This
unity is a product of the very structure of consciousness:
‘retention—now—protention’. As defined earlier, retention refers to the
presentation of the perceptual act (of a phase) which is retained in
consciousness even though it is no longer immediately present. Protention is
presentation of that which is hitherto not given, but is yet to be perceived,
thus embodying that which is expected. Retentional consciousness enables a
pre-figuring of the empty horizons of perception such that it is inalienably
associated with anticipations.
In spelling out negation of anticipations, Husserl always
speaks of fulfillment as partial. Partial fulfillment grants to
experience the unity necessary for the act to maintain its flow, and as such
there cannot be a complete non-fulfillment. The absence of the nose does
not constrain the unfolding of perceptual experience, of the face as a whole.
But the perception now is not of the nose but of something else, a flat patch
(OBSERVATION 4). The lived experience does manifest as continuous, but it
appears to be other than expected (a flat patch and not the nose), thereby
calling for an abrupt break. There is a substratum which is the body of change,
of becoming otherwise, of alteration. The substratum working as the general
framework persists throughout the act of perception giving unity of the act.
The conflict between contrary determinations (amid what is
anticipated and what is presented) results in the institution of a new and
altered perceptual sense. Not only does the sense of the presented object get
altered, but intentions associated with it and the structure of now possible
anticipations also gets modified. The origin of negation is in the
pre-predicative realm of receptive experience. Green superimposes itself on the
empty red-intention (a flat patch superimposes itself on the nose) thereby
altering the substratum given in the original perception – giving it a new
sense, and crossing out the anticipated sense. In the unfolding of perception,
a sense is either affirmed (when fulfilled) or renewed (when unfulfilled).
To sum up, normal unobstructed original object-constitution
must precede negation. This original constitution is carried out in a series of
apperceptive apprehensions which are held in retention and thus generate
expectation. Negation is a case of modification, which is essentially of the
nature of a superimposition due to a case of conflicting intentions directed
against each other. So what is fundamental to negation is the displacement and
substitution of one sense (old sense) by another (new sense). Yet this
annulment is never absolute but concerns itself with a limited range.
To return to the Nose, let us examine two
possibilities: (a) absence as external event, without its locus in
consciousness (b) absence as a modification of an intending
consciousness. In other words, absence could either be a whim of the nose (as
external to consciousness) or a whim of (an intending) consciousness. Either
the nose walked off in the middle of the night or it had gone missing by trick
of Kovalev’s own intentions. There is some absurdity in the second case, where
a consciousness simultaneously expects X and intends not-X. For this reason, by
admitting the possibility of perceptual negation, one necessitates withdrawal
from a reality that is purely submerged and justified by consciousness. In both
cases, no doubt it is consciousness which experiences the perceptual negation.
But it seems that the source and justification of negation cannot
be derived from consciousness. The notion of externality comes with a force the
moment one desires to construe what triggered a disappointment. It is perhaps
for this reason that Husserl’s descriptions of the constitution of perceptual
sense carry an underlying assertion: that to constitute is not to create.
Rather it is the condition of the possibility of experience and knowledge.
David Hume in pleading the case of habit asserted the
essential unjustifiability of our beliefs about the external world. Being
accustomed to the manner in which experience has proceeded in the past we have
the expectation for a similar future. That the sun shall rise every morning is
an inductive generalization from our experience of sun having risen every
morning. Yet such an experience must always be probabilistic in nature. One
cannot be absolutely certain about its claims, there might be an abrupt denial.
Interestingly, such a denial come as a completely alarm to the experiencing
subject. Habit has to have an empirical basis. The Nose presents one
such case of perceptual denial. It proves that the nature of reality is
ultimately contingent and the subject’s construal of an object’s horizon of
possibility cannot obstruct a denial. In fact the horizon of possibility
extends with every disappointment — perhaps a little with the green dented
rear-side of the ball and a great deal more with a missing nose! In this sense,
the main role of negation is to push the limit of the actual world.
To answer the question with which we began, what must
trigger the failure of an anticipation, the answer can only be the contingent
character of nature — the whim of the nose — and thereby of perceptual
experience. The pre-figurings in the empty horizons waiting to be fulfilled,
might not be fulfilled precisely because consciousness cannot determine and
ensure a fulfillment. The external, one hand, determines what consciousness
must anticipate. On the other, it is also responsible for whether the
anticipated will be fulfilled or not. While perceptual experience is essential
to consciousness and the locus of its strength, perceptual fulfillment is only
its desire, and could be construed as the Achilles’ heel, a territory over
which consciousness cannot have any real power, yet it continues to yearn for
it.
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