Metaphysical or Not

by Krishnaswamy

One of the main objections to an attempt at grounding ethical theories on metaphysical notions on being or individuality is the possibility of their being other metaphysical views and the impossibility of arbitrating between any two contending views on the notion of being. Thus the main advantage of a deontological tradition, which eschews a metaphysical approach, is that its concept of equality would be unique, in the sense of generating only one theory of justice and it would even have the added advantage of allowing the legitimacy of differing metaphysical views as to the good and thereby allowing the promotion of a plural society. But what if a theory of equality, in a deontological tradition, is not unique and suffers from the same defect -- the defect of engendering differing conceptions of justice -- as the metaphysical tradition? If such is the case, then we will have to discard both the metaphysical and the deontological approaches and try another method of establishing ethics. The capability approach is one such contender for leading the way in building ethics on new and surer grounds.

Before we do accept the capability approach, we will have to see whether their criticism against Rawls is a fair one and also whether Nussbaum’s approach is a completely new one in the sense of not being reducible to either the metaphysical or the deontological approach. From my reading of Sen (pg 20, Equality of What?), I gather that one main criticism of his centers around the inability of Rawls to determine complete equality (or individuality, both are, I feel, the same). Sen feels that there is still differing kinds of physical and mental abilities that make people differ. But these differences are merely physical or personal differences. The deontological tradition by explicitly avoiding the metaphysical (or physical) route doesn’t take into consideration such physical differences. A fatal objection to Rawls would be if there are moral differences between people.

One of the advantages that the capability approach has is that it doesn’t attempt at a metaphysical grounding. As Nussbaum herself says, “The capabilities are…presented as the source of political principles for a liberal pluralistic society; they are set in the context of a type of political liberalism that makes them specifically political goals and presents them in a manner free of any specific metaphysical grounding.” (pg 70) The capability approach, as we know, implicitly asserts that life or capabilities, or the exercise of them, is a good. According to me, any assertion that there is a good is a metaphysical view. If so, then the capability approach would seem to be reducible to a metaphysical approach and thereby suffer the same defects as that method.